Western New England Law Review
Volume 34 34 (2012)
Issue 2

Article 4

1-1-2012

“FOR TOMORROW WILL WORRY ABOUT
ITSELF": IVAN ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING
SOCIETY AND THE REDISCOVERY OF
HOPE
Jared Gibbs
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, jagibbs2@vt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Jared Gibbs, “FOR TOMORROW WILL WORRY ABOUT ITSELF": IVAN ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING SOCIETY AND THE
REDISCOVERY OF HOPE, 34 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 381 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

“FOR TOMORROW WILL WORRY ABOUT
ITSELF”1: IVAN ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING
SOCIETY AND THE
REDISCOVERY OF HOPE
JARED GIBBS*
INTRODUCTION
It seems as if Americans are always debating educational re
forms of one sort or another.2 Over time, this tends to give any
thinking about ways to improve the nature of education a certain
Sisyphean quality. And since our culture seems loath to release its
hold on a conception of progress that understands it as unending
improvement3, Sisyphus’s situation seems an apt metaphor for our
own.4 In his book, Deschooling Society,5 (hereinafter Deschooling)
Ivan Illich bases his critique of American schooling in part on an
understanding of progress as a maddening idea.6 As he puts it, “the
law of ‘rising expectations’ [is] a euphemism for a growing frustra
tion gap . . . .”7 His move is to reject the idea that a system of
perfect manipulation can be realized and result in perfect learning,
in educational outcomes that always meet expectations.8 It is also
to recognize that, as Orestes Brownson noted before public schools
* Instructor of English, Virginia Tech. An early version of this paper was
presented at the Symposium Radical Nemesis: Re-Envisioning Ivan Illich’s Theories on
Social Institutions at Western New England University School of Law on April 1, 2011.
I would like to thank the WNE faculty for organizing and hosting such a wonderful
event. Special thanks to Erin Buzuvis for answering my countless questions and
arranging for my transportation to and from the Symposium. I would also like to thank
Fritz Oehlschlaeger for reading and commenting on this paper many times during its
development.
1. Matthew 6:34 (New International Version).
2. See Marcia Clemmitt, School Reform: Should Evaluation of Teachers Rest on
Students’ Test Scores?, 21 CQ RESEARCHER 385, 394-95 (2011) (reviewing the last 20
years of education reform debates).
3. NEIL POSTMAN, BUILDING A BRIDGE TO THE 18TH CENTURY 24-29 (1999).
4. IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY 109 (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., Harper &
Row 1971).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 42-43.
7. Id. at 108-09.
8. Id. at 108.
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even existed in America, “[e]ducated, in some sense, all our chil
dren are, and will be, whether we will or not.”9
This Article considers Ivan Illich’s critique of schools as manip
ulative institutions, examining both the institutional spectrum he
uses to evaluate the structure of modern schooling and the “learn
ing webs”10 he suggests as alternative educational structures. It
then explores the implications of Illich’s proposed “learning webs,”
specifically focusing on the question of where common standards
and authority are to be found within these structures. It concludes
that Illich is purposefully vague in regard to standards and author
ity, because such issues can too easily become matters of manipula
tion and control themselves.
I. INSTITUTIONAL SPECTRUM
Illich’s Deschooling is really a collection of essays rather than
one through-composed argument; its chapters present not one part
of an argument after another but variations on the same essential
theme.11 That argument is, as suggested above, in large part about
the problem of institutional manipulation. This focus makes, to my
mind, chapter four of Deschooling, “Institutional Spectrum,” a key
section of the book.12 In it, we get something of a manifesto from
Illich:
I believe that a desirable future depends on our deliberately
choosing a life of action over a life of consumption, on our en
gendering a life style which will enable us to be spontaneous, in
dependent, yet related to each other, rather than maintaining a
life style which only allows us to make and unmake, produce and
consume—a style of life which is merely a way station on the
road to the depletion and pollution of the environment. The fu
ture depends more upon our choice of institutions which support
a life of action than on our developing new ideologies and tech
nologies. We need a set of criteria which will permit us to recog
nize those institutions which support personal growth rather than
addiction, as well as the will to invest our technological resources
preferentially in such institutions of growth.13
9.
2 BOST.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Orestes Augustus Brownson, Review of Horace Mann’s Second Annual Report,
Q. REV. 393, 394 (1839).
ILLICH, supra note 4, at 72.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 52-53.
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The institutional spectrum Illich lays out is just such a way to iden
tify those institutions that support “a life of action over a life of
consumption.”14 His spectrum ranges from manipulative (right
wing) to convivial (left-wing) institutions.15 Manipulative institu
tions, according to my reading of Illich, have three main features:
possession, definition, and production.16 Whether it is a jail or a
mental hospital, a right-wing institution possesses its subjects—they
are separated, set apart.17 This setting apart allows the subjects to
be defined as well—they are labeled as criminals, as insane.18 Fi
nally, these institutions are concerned with the production of cer
tain behaviors and roles. Jails are supposed to produce civil, lawabiding citizens; mental hospitals are supposed to produce sane, ra
tional individuals.19
The fundamental feature of convivial institutions, on the other
hand, is that they allow for individual agency.20 Being free to act as
one chooses is, after all, the opposite of being manipulated. This
basic difference, the dichotomy of action that defines Illich’s institu
tional spectrum, allows us to evaluate seemingly similar institutions.
One might expect, for example, that ostensibly benevolent social
and civil service institutions would be convivial. Illich notes, how
ever, that “service institutions” are found at “both extremes of the
spectrum.”21 With right-wing institutions, “service is imposed ma
nipulation” delivered through “highly complex and costly produc
tion processes,” which are designed to foster consumer dependence
on an institution’s service.22 Left-wing service institutions, on the
other hand, provide “amplified opportunity within formally defined
limits, while the client remains a free agent.”23 The varied ways in
14. Id. at 52.
15. See id. at 53-55. Here, Illich does not use “right” and “left” in the way they
are used in everyday American political discussions.
16. Id. at 53-56.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 54.
19. Id.; see also JOHN BENDER, IMAGINING THE PENITENTIARY (1987). Bender
traces the parallel development of the novel and the modern penitentiary. He notes,
for instance, that the “old prisons neither told stories nor assigned roles.” Id. at 26. But
prison reformers, “beginning especially in England of the 1770s and prevailing through
out America and Europe during the 1840s, envisioned prison interiors as precisely re
fined instruments . . . . [T]hey aimed to reshape the life story of each criminal by the
measured application of pleasure and pain within a planned framework.” Id. at 22.
20. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 54.
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id..
23. Id.
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which “service” is delivered, then, suggest that one may not judge
an institution merely by its apparent purpose.
II. SCHOOLS AS MANIPULATIVE INSTITUTIONS
Illich labels schools as manipulative institutions, not convivial
ones, so let us consider the extent to which they exhibit the three
phenomena of right-wing enterprises: possession, definition, and
production. First, schools possess children in a very real way, clois
tering them, and supposedly protecting them from the real world.
Earlier in Deschooling, Illich reminds us that this arrangement is a
relatively recent phenomenon, the idea of childhood having ap
peared “along with the pocket watch and the Christian moneylend
ers of the Renaissance.”24 Illich’s stance is supported by Neil
Postman, who argues that the specific technological change that al
lowed for the creation of childhood was the invention of the print
ing press and the accompanying rise in literacy.25 In other words,
childhood developed in response to the increasing technological so
phistication of the adult world; such technology requiring more
time to master.26
Once imagined as a separate class, it is perhaps inevitable that
the decision would be made to separate children from the adult
world in order to properly educate them. At the same time, classi
fying children as young people who do not know or understand
“the way things are” is an invitation to infantilize and manipulate
them. If the world is seen as too complex for children to fully un
derstand, it logically follows—or so we are used to thinking—that
children should not have to grapple with the realities of the world
until they can fully comprehend them. The young, then, are set
aside, set apart, and “prepared” for the real world. Illich worries
over this institutionalized irresponsibility, stating that the invention
of “[c]hildhood” has resulted in a loss of “the dignity and maturity
of the young.”27 His argument seems to say, “kids these days are
too coddled,” the implication being that children need to learn
24. Id. at 26.
25. NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 36 (1982).
26. More specifically, Postman argues that
as the printing press played out its hand it became obvious that a new kind of
adulthood had been invented. From print onward, adulthood had to be
earned. It became a symbolic, not a biological achievement. From print on
ward, the young would have to become adults, and they would have to do it by
learning to read, by entering the world of typography.
Id.
27.

ILLICH, supra note 4, at 26.

2012] ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING AND THE REDISCOVERY OF HOPE

385

sooner about the harsh world they inhabit—they need to face the
real world, as it were, which everyone knows is a cruel, unforgiving,
and all-around tedious place to inhabit. Illich’s conclusion, how
ever, flips the usual complaint on its head.28 The current arrange
ment, he implies, is to cloister the young, protecting them from the
world’s cruel realities until they are of age, at which point they must
deal with it.29 “If society were to outgrow its age of childhood,” he
writes, “it would have to become livable for the young. The present
disjunction between an adult society which pretends to be humane
and a school environment which mocks reality could no longer be
maintained.”30 In the present arrangement, children are ideally ini
tiated little by little into adult life, but full responsibility is not de
manded of them, if any responsibility is demanded at all, until they
have come of age. By this reasoning, schools not only possess the
young, they define them. Not only do children know nothing and
understand nothing, they are incapable of responsibility. It is worth
noting that this arrangement is unfair to both children and adults—
if the young are figured as wholly without responsibility, then it
seems reasonable to conceive of adults as totally responsible. As
Illich notes, “[s]chool, by its very nature, tends to make a total
claim on the time and energies of its participants. This, in turn,
makes the teacher into custodian, preacher, and therapist.”31 In
other words, teachers become totally responsible for childrens’ edu
cation, which means teachers can be held totally accountable if the
children fail to learn.32
To possess and define children is really to objectify them. We
often refer to children as our “most precious resource,” which al
lows us to figure education as a production process.33 Resources
28. Id. at 1-7.
29. Id. at 26-33.
30. Id. at 28. Illich’s argument here is, to my mind, extremely optimistic. It is not
at all a sure thing that a culture freed from the idea of childhood will take notice of its
own inhumane attributes and correct them. The world was often cruel before the in
vention of childhood, and there is a good chance its inhumane aspects would persist
even if childhood disappeared. In fact, Neil Postman, who was familiar with Illich’s
work and even mentions Deschooling Society by name in his own work, The Disappear
ance of Childhood, argues against Illich on this point. POSTMAN, supra note 25, at 139
41. He includes in his study a collection of child crime statistics that he suggests indi
cate “both the decline of childhood and a corresponding diminution in the character of
adulthood.” Id. at 134. In short, Postman argues that the disappearance of childhood
results not in a more humane world but in both crueler children and adults. Id. at 138.
31. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 30.
32. See, e.g., Clemmitt, supra note 2 (discussing the current push for high-stakes
teacher evaluations).
33. See POSTMAN, supra note 25, at 140.
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are not “useful” until they are developed or manipulated in such a
way as to produce a useful object. A cursory examination of educa
tional language and metaphor makes clear the extent to which
school is seen as a productive process. We constantly refer, for ex
ample, to the production of roles; I have heard students referred to
as “active learners,” “productive members of society,” “critical
thinkers,” “smart consumers,” “responsible citizens,” and so forth.
This is not at all the same as saying that the young will by experi
ence (succeeding in some responsibilities and failing in others), dis
cover the importance of learning for themselves, coming to
understand what it means to be a member of a community, and
recognizing the value of a skeptical, critical mind. Instead, educa
tion is seen as the process by which a child is shaped into one or
more specific roles.34
It is possible, as we see, to understand schools as meeting Il
lich’s three criteria of manipulative institutions.35 In chapter six of
Deschooling, “Learning Webs,” Illich outlines educational institu
tions that he argues would be convivial instead of manipulative.36
The main shift outlined in this chapter is that of the learner, from a
passive recipient of institutional treatments to an active director of
the child’s own educational interests.37 Illich refers to this sug
gested system as “learning webs,” or “opportunity webs,” though,
in relation to the term “web,” he notes, “I wish we had another
word to designate such reticular structures for mutual access, a
word less evocative of entrapment, less degraded by current usage
and more suggestive of the fact that any such arrangement includes
legal, organizational, and technical aspects.”38 The purpose of
these networks is to provide all learners with broad access to “fair

34. POSTMAN, supra note 3, at 125-26. Postman specifically suggests that a mod
ern child’s primary role is as a market:
Children are neither blank tablets nor budding plants. They are markets . . . .
There is very little the culture wants to do for children except to make them
into consumers . . . . In this conception, a child’s mind is not the pages of a
book, and a child is not a plant to be pruned. A child is an economic creature,
not different from an adult, whose sense of worth is to be founded entirely on
his or her capacity to secure material benefits, and whose purpose is to fuel a
market economy.
Id.
35. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 53-56.
36. Id. at 72.
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id. at 76-77.
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use” educational objects, as well as other interested, skilled, or
knowledgeable individuals, with only minimal restrictions.39
III.

IMPLICATIONS

AND

ISSUES

Thus far, I have attempted to outline, with some commentary,
the basic argument that runs throughout Illich’s Deschooling Soci
ety.40 At this point, I think it is necessary to briefly cover two
prominent aspects of the educational “reforms” Illich proposes in
“Learning Webs,”41 and to consider a couple of problems with
those aspects. I use the word “problem” here both because some
will find the implications of Illich’s proposals truly problematic, and
because those proposals, though meant to be solutions to social and
educational problems discussed earlier in Deschooling, carry their
own attendant difficulties.
First, let us consider the economic implications of Illich’s pro
posals. As noted above, Illich is interested in creating educational
structures that give a learner broad access to educational objects
and skilled, knowledgeable individuals.42 He goes on to argue that
[i]n a world which is controlled and owned by nations and corpo
rations, only limited access to educational objects will ever be
possible. But increased access to those objects which can be
shared for educational purposes may enlighten us enough to help
us to break through these ultimate political barriers. Public
schools transfer control over the educational uses of objects from
private to professional hands. The institutional inversion of
schools could empower the individual to reclaim the right to use
them for education. A truly public kind of ownership might be
gin to emerge if private or corporate control over the educational
aspect of “things” were brought to the vanishing point.43

Here, Illich appears to suggest that private property should be se
verely restricted. This suggestion, I imagine, would indeed be prob
lematic for many individuals, and it would be easy to dismiss his
39. Id. at 77-79. The terminology Illich uses to describe his proposed learning
webs is strikingly similar to that of the Internet. While the similarities and differences
between Illich’s learning webs and the Internet’s structure deserve some sustained criti
cal attention, I do not feel the need to give it that attention here. It is enough to note
that the Internet can fill to a significant extent the educational niches Illich outlines in
this chapter, though the ability of one to take full advantage of its resources and oppor
tunities is still too highly dependent on individual technological investment.
40. ILLICH, supra note 4.
41. Id. at 72-73.
42. Id. at 77-79.
43. Id. at 86-87.
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argument as extreme and wholly unrealistic. But Illich’s property
concerns are actually quite similar to debates about the role of pri
vate property in a democracy that have persisted throughout much
of American history, and it would be worthwhile to step aside
briefly and consider some of that history.
In his book, The Revolt of the Elites, Christopher Lasch in part
focuses on the history of early Americans’ emphasis on property
ownership and its relation to competence and independence.44 Jef
ferson, of course, is well known to have thought that the ideal dem
ocratic society was one of small, independent farmers.45 This ideal
was still visible, Lasch argues, when Lincoln signed the Homestead
Act into law:
The vision of the ideal democrat as the self-respecting artisan or
agrarian in “his own workshop, . . . his own house,” in the words
of George Henry Evans, found legislative expression in the
Homestead Act of 1862, which Lincoln hoped would give “every
man” the “means and opportunity of bettering his condition.” In
the same speech in which he recommended the homestead policy
on these grounds, Lincoln referred to “working men” as the “ba
sis of all governments”—a pretty good indication that he con
ceived of property as a means not of escaping from labor but of
realizing its full potential.46

The point Lasch attempts to make here is that property ownership
is important for developing competent and independent democratic
citizens, because it teaches the value of labor and learning at the
same time—they are intertwined. This fusion of labor and learning
was fundamental to the way in which early Americans understood
themselves as opposed to their European counterparts.47 “In Eu
rope,” Lasch writes, “the laboring classes allegedly lived on the
verge of destitution, but it was not only their poverty that staggered
Americans but their exclusion from civic life, from the world of
learning and culture—from all the influences that stimulate intellec
tual curiosity and broaden people’s intellectual horizons.”48 He as
serts that, unlike modern Americans, early Americans would have
understood the idea of “equal opportunity” to be “a matter more of
44. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY 7-8 (1995).
45. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (October 28, 1785),
in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 395-398 (1977).
46. LASCH, supra note 44, at 71.
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id. at 58.
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intellectual than of material enrichment. It was their restless curi
osity, their skeptical and iconoclastic turn of mind, their resource
fulness and self-reliance, their capacity for invention and
improvisation that most dramatically seemed to differentiate the la
boring classes in America from their European counterparts.”49
When Lincoln, then, stated that he hoped the Homestead Act
would provide every man the means for “bettering his condition,”
he was not primarily speaking, as we do now, of material or mone
tary accumulation. Lasch explains that Lincoln
[i]n his 1859 speech to the Wisconsin Agricultural Society, . . .
upheld a norm of intensive agriculture diametrically opposed to
the wasteful, migratory habits of those who saw land merely as a
source of speculative profit. He condemned the “ambition for
broad acres,” which encouraged “careless, half performed, slov
enly work.” He spoke highly of the “effect of thorough cultiva
tion upon the farmer’s mind.” He said that is would prove an
“exhaustless source of profitable enjoyment” to a “mind, already
trained to thought, in the country school, or higher school.” Nur
ture, not acquisition, was the burden of his exhortation.50

Despite Lincoln’s words, America was already moving toward
a culture in which learning and labor were separated, and thus, a
culture in which the learned and the laboring were two separate
classes.51 Concern for this cultural shift can be seen in Thoreau’s,
Walden, first published in 1854, though begun nearly a decade
before Lincoln’s speech.52 Much has been written about Thoreau’s
skepticism in Walden regarding technological progress, the fruits of
which he calls “pretty toys, which distract our attention from seri
ous things.”53 One modern convenience at which he directed his
criticism was the railroad. Some of this disdain for the railroad was
surely personal; its arrival had turned Concord, Massachusetts,
Thoreau’s home, into essentially a suburb of Boston, which he saw
as no good thing.54 At the same time, however, his criticism of the
railroad focuses significantly on the degraded circumstances of the
laborers who built it. He writes:
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72-73.
Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in the Woods, in THOREAU: A WEEK
ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK RIVERS; WALDEN; THE MAINE WOODS; CAPE
COD. 321 (1985).
53. Thoreau, supra note 52, at 363.
54. RICHARD LEBEAUX, YOUNG MAN THOREAU 24 (1977).
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It is a mistake to suppose that, in a country where the usual evi
dences of civilization exist, the condition of a very large body of
the inhabitants may not be as degraded as that of savages. . . . To
know this I should not need to look further than to the shanties
which every where border our railroads, that last improvement of
civilization; where I see in my daily walks human beings living in
sties, and all winter with an open door, for the sake of light, with
out any visible, often imaginable, wood pile, and the forms of
both old and young are permanently contracted by the long habit
of shrinking from cold and misery, and the development of all
their limbs and faculties is checked. It certainly is fair to look at
that class by whose labor the works which distinguish this genera
tion are accomplished.55

Thoreau’s description here is blunt and effective, and the biting sar
casm of the quote’s final sentence belies his disdain for the inherent
inequity he sees in the railroad, as well as for those Americans who
turn a blind eye to it. It is also notable that Thoreau here makes a
point of highlighting the impact of physical hardship on both the
laborers’ physical and mental health, writing that the cold and mis
ery checks “the development of all their limbs and faculties.”56 This
concern for the lack of intellectual stimulation in such wage labor
appears again, following further criticism of the railroad.57 Thoreau
recognizes and addresses the natural desire for laborers to take
pride in their work, to think of it as worthwhile and valuable to
society, no matter how degrading:
‘What!’ exclaim a million Irishmen starting up from all the shan
ties in the land, ‘is not this railroad which we have built a good
thing?’ Yes, I answer, comparatively good, that is, you might
have done worse; but I wish, as you are brothers of mine, that
you could have spent your time better than digging in this dirt.58

Here, of course, Thoreau means that he wishes they might have
spent their time better than only digging in the dirt (he himself
spends a good bit of his time at Walden digging in the dirt).59 As he
repeatedly reminds us in Walden, part of his project there was to
discover for himself how little dirt digging was required to sustain a
full intellectual life: “I do not wish to be any more busy with my
hands than is necessary. My head is hands and feet. I feel all my
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Thoreau, supra note 52, at 350.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 446.
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best faculties concentrated in it.”60 For Thoreau, it is thoroughly
lamentable that the “million Irishmen” building the nation’s rail
roads are forced by circumstances to live only in hands and feet,
while their higher faculties atrophy.
Of greater concern to Thoreau, at least in terms of his audience
for Walden, is what he sees as the atrophy of both the physical and
mental faculties of that class of Americans who most benefit from
the division of labor. This is where Thoreau’s concern for the inter
twined nature of labor and learning is most clearly visible. He ar
gues that by avoiding labor, and in some cases developing a general
contempt for it, the leisure class does not further develop their
mental faculties but neglects them as well: “Where is this division of
labor to end?” he asks, “and what object does it finally serve? No
doubt another may also think for me; but it is not therefore desira
ble that he should do so to the exclusion of my thinking for my
self.”61 But Thoreau sees that some of his fellow Americans are
indeed allowing others to labor and think for them, which, for him,
is analogous to dying:
Much it concerns a man, forsooth, how a few sticks are slanted
over him or under him, and what colors are daubed upon his box.
It would signify somewhat, if, in any earnest sense, he slanted
them and daubed it; but the spirit having departed out of the
tenant, it is of a piece with constructing his own coffin,—architec
ture of the grave, and ‘carpenter,’ is but another name for ‘coffin
maker.’62

It is only by combining learning and labor, Thoreau suggests, that
people may realize the full potential of their faculties: “Who knows
but if men constructed their dwellings with their own hands, and
provided food for themselves and families simply and honestly
enough, the poetic faculty would be universally developed, as birds
universally sing when they are so engaged?”63
The ideal of citizen as property-owner and artisan or agrarian
persisted for some time,64 despite the obvious fact that many citi
zens were, as Thoreau perceived, excluded or distracted from that
ideal.65 But the concerns of Thoreau and others went unheeded for
60. Id. at 400.
61. Id. at 359.
62. Id. at 360.
63. Id. at 359.
64. LASCH, supra note 44, at 62.
65. Thoreau, supra note 52, at 350-65.
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the most part—there was just too much money to be made, and
Lasch writes that
[b]y the end of the nineteenth century the “dignity of labor” had
become an empty phrase, uttered without conviction on ritual oc
casions. The “laboring classes” no longer referred to the vast
majority of self-reliant, self-respecting citizens; the term now re
ferred to a permanent class of hirelings, escape from which ap
peared to be the only compelling definition of opportunity.66

It was, he argues, the closing of the frontier that finally made
America’s class problem too visible to ignore:
The Census Bureau’s announcement, in 1890, that the country no
longer “had a frontier of settlement” almost immediately took on
enormous symbolic importance. This “brief official statement,”
. . . gave new urgency to debates about the “social question.”
More than any other development, the closing of the frontier
forced Americans to reckon with the proletarianization of labor,
the growing gulf between wealth and poverty, and the tendency
of each to become hereditary.67

Lasch notes, though, that America has never really fully reckoned
with the problems of wage labor, economic disparity, and inherited
privilege and poverty.68 He spends much of this portion of Revolt
of the Elites discussing how we have distracted ourselves from these
problems by shifting our focus from true equality in citizenship to
equal opportunity—or social mobility—as well as equality of lan
guage.69 He writes,
The recognition of equal rights is a necessary but insufficient con
dition of democratic citizenship. Unless everyone has equal ac
cess to the means of competence (as we might speak of them),
equal rights will not confer self-respect. . . . Political equality—
citizenship—equalizes people who are otherwise unequal in their
capacities, and the universalization of citizenship therefore has to
be accompanied . . . by measures designed to assure the broadest
distribution of economic and political responsibility [possible].70
66. LASCH, supra note 44, at 72-73.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Id. at 77-78.
69. LASCH, supra note 44, at 50-91. Illich himself, in the opening chapter of
Deschooling, argues that, whatever language we use to frame public school, it does
not—and cannot in its current form—promote anything approaching real equality, as
economic status plays too strong a role in determining whether or not a student will be
successful in school. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 6.
70. LASCH, supra note 44, at 88.
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Lasch doesn’t exactly call for public ownership of property here, as
Illich essentially does in Deschooling,71 but he suggests an arrange
ment of property, responsibility, and competency that is similar to
Illich’s, while placing it within a tradition of American democratic
thought. Illich’s and Lasch’s arguments are connected by a shared
emphasis on, in Lasch’s words, “equal access to the means of com
petence,”72 which, it seems to me, is what Illich hopes his proposed
learning webs and expanded public property will provide. In the
first chapter of Deschooling, Illich notes,
It should be obvious that even with schools of equal quality a
poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one. Even if they
attend equal schools and begin at the same age, poor children
lack most of the educational opportunities which are casually
available to the middle-class child. These advantages range from
conversation and books in the home to vacation travel and a dif
ferent sense of oneself, and apply, for the child who enjoys them,
both in and out of school. So the poorer student will generally
fall behind so long as he depends on school for advancement or
learning.73

In Lasch’s language, Illich here argues that, given the current class
and property structure, it is folly to expect schools alone to equalize
the means of competence, because middle- and upper-class students
will always possess greater means outside of school for their intel
lectual development. This problem is what underpins Illich’s con
cern for property and why his proposals take the form they do.
Let us consider, in closing out this section, one of Illich’s sug
gestions in “Learning Webs,” examining its property implications,
and judging just how radical a proposal it is. He writes,
If the goals of learning were no longer dominated by schools and
schoolteachers, the market for learners would be much more va
rious and the definition of “educational artifacts” would be less
restrictive. There could be tool shops, libraries, laboratories, and
gaming rooms. Photo labs and offset presses would allow neigh
borhood newspapers to flourish. Some storefront learning cen
ters could contain viewing booths for closed-circuit television,
others could feature office equipment for use and for repair. The
jukebox or the record player would be commonplace, with some
specializing in classical music, others in international folk tunes,
others in jazz. Film clubs would compete with each other and
71. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 86-87.
72. LASCH, supra note 44, at 88.
73. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 6.
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with commercial television. Museum outlets could be networks
for circulating exhibits of works of art, both old and new, origi
nals and reproductions, perhaps administered by the various met
ropolitan museums.74

If we overlook the outdated technology referenced here, which is
really of no consequence anyway, it is easy to see that the reposito
ries of educational artifacts described by Illich resemble public
lending libraries. Though we are so used to them that we may over
look this fact, public libraries are specifically meant to address the
issue of equal opportunity to some of the means of competence, a
purpose that has persisted since the first lending libraries were es
tablished in America.75 In his autobiography, Ben Franklin relates
his role in the creation of a subscription library in Philadelphia.76
He writes,
At the time I establish’d myself in Pennsylvania, there was not a
good bookseller’s shop in any of the colonies to the southward of
Boston. In New York and Philad’a the printers were indeed sta
tioners; they sold only paper, etc., almanacs, ballads, and a few
common school-books. Those who lov’d reading were oblig’d to
send for their books from England . . . I propos’d to render the
benefit from books more common, by commencing a public sub
scription library . . . . So few were the readers at that time in
Philadelphia, and the majority of us so poor, that I was not able,
with great industry, to find more than fifty persons, mostly young
tradesmen, willing to pay down for this purpose forty shillings
each, and ten shillings per annum. On this little fund we began
. . . . The institution soon manifested its utility, was imitated by
other towns, and in other provinces. The libraries were aug
mented by donations; reading became fashionable; and our peo
ple, having no public amusements to divert their attention from
study, became better acquainted with books, and in a few years
were observ’d by strangers to be better instructed and more intel
ligent than people of the same rank generally are in other
countries.77

As is evident in the preceding quotation, in Franklin’s case, the li
brary was a means of addressing resource scarcity. Illich’s reposito
ries are also meant to address resource scarcity, but he asserts that
74. Id. at 84.
75. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE COLLECTION
PHY 62 (1961).
76. Id. at 62-63.
77. Id. at 62.

OF

BIOGRAPHY

AND

AUTOBIOGRA

2012] ILLICH’S DESCHOOLING AND THE REDISCOVERY OF HOPE

395

it is an artificial scarcity.78 The artifacts he lists are available, and
generally in great numbers, but the barriers of capital and institu
tional interest restrict their use.79 In one way or another, then, edu
cational equality comes back to the issue of property. Franklin and
his peers shared in a general lack of property in the form of books,
and so nearly everyone benefited from the greater number of books
made available through the library.80 Illich’s repositories sound
radical, on the other hand, because so many of us already have ac
cess, in one way or another, to the sorts of property (educational
artifacts) he lists, and so we are likely to feel as if something has
been taken from us if that property becomes publicly instead of pri
vately owned.
IV. STANDARDS

AND

AUTHORITY

Even if Illich’s suggestions regarding private property were ac
cepted, one might still reject his learning webs on the grounds that
they would make it impossible to develop common standards of ex
cellence or legitimate authority. Without institutional authority,
who will determine what constitutes good work, accurate knowl
edge, or even truth? In short, if Illich gets his way, what is to keep
learning webs from descending into anarchy? He does not directly
address this issue, noting only that
[d]eschooling education should increase—rather than stifle—the
search for men with practical wisdom who would be willing to
sustain the newcomer in his educational adventure. As masters
of their art abandon the claim to be superior informants or skill
models, their claim to superior wisdom will begin to ring true.81

This statement is maddeningly vague, but I think we can tease out
Illich’s point here. Within manipulative institutions, claims to supe
rior skill, knowledge, or wisdom are always suspect—they are just
as likely as not to be another form of manipulation. Once the insti
tutional framework has been stripped away, Illich implies, such
claims will again carry weight, as a learner will be free to interro
gate their veracity. This is an intriguing notion, but it still lacks the
sort of specificity necessary for it to be compelling.
A more concrete way that common standards of excellence
and legitimate authority might be achieved within learning webs is
78. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 79-87.
79. Id. at 79-83.
80. FRANKLIN, supra note 75, at 62.
81. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 97.
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by combining Illich’s ideas with Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a
“practice,” as presented in his book, After Virtue. 82 MacIntyre de
fines a practice as
any coherent and complex form of socially established coopera
tive human activity through which goods internal to that form of
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those stan
dards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defini
tive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an
example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with
skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is
not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice;
farming is. So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biol
ogy, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and
music.83

What one immediately notices in this definition of a practice is that
the examples given are familiar to us as fields, vocations, or trades
in which one might find employment. What is significant, though, is
the extent to which these practices are subsumed and compromised
by institutions concerned primarily with what MacIntyre calls exter
nal goods.84
In explaining goods internal to and external to a practice,
MacIntyre uses the example of a child who is enticed to the game of
chess with the promise of candy, a certain amount just for playing,
and an additional portion if he or she is able to win the game.85 As
MacIntyre notes, “so long as it is the candy alone which provides
the child with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no rea
son not to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can
do so successfully.”86 The hope, though, is that there will come a
time when the child will become motivated to play chess not on the
promise of candy but because he or she
will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a
certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagina
tion and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 188.
Id.
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not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to
excel in whatever way the game of chess demands.87

As this example shows, external and internal goods differ in vital
ways. External goods are “contingently attached to . . . practices by
the accidents of social circumstance—in the case of the imaginary
child candy, in the case of real adults such goods as prestige, status
and money.”88 What is crucial, MacIntyre notes, is that there “are
always alternative ways for achieving [external] goods, and their
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular
kind of practice,” not to mention that such goods tend to promote a
success-at-all-costs approach to a practice.89 Internal goods, on the
other hand, are goods that can be achieved only within the bounda
ries of the practice itself. “We call them internal,” MacIntyre
writes,
for two reasons: first, as I have already suggested, because we can
only specify them in terms of chess or some other game [or prac
tice] of that specific kind and by means of examples from such
games [or practices] . . . and secondly because they can only be
identified and recognized by the experience of participating in
the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant experience
are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods.90

Perhaps most important, as MacIntyre goes on to note, is that
[e]xternal goods are . . . characteristically objects of competition
in which there must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods
are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is charac
teristic of them that their achievement is good for the whole com
munity who participate in the practice.91

If we revisit the Illich quote at the beginning of this section, we
can see that he may have in mind something very much like
MacIntyre’s notion of a practice.92 When Illich refers to “masters
of their art,”93 it is likely that he is thinking of master craftsmen,
artisans, practitioners, etc.—individuals who have mastered their
respective practices by pursuing and achieving primarily goods in
ternal to those practices. Illich perhaps also recognizes that such
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 188-89.
91. Id. at 190-91.
92. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 97.
93. Id.
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individuals, and the practices they represent, offer the best and rela
tively accessible and open framework within which common stan
dards and legitimate authority can properly function. As MacIntyre
explains,
[a] practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to
rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a prac
tice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inade
quacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject
my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the stan
dards which currently and partially define the practice. Practices
of course, as I have just noticed, have a history: games, sciences
and arts all have histories. Thus the standards are not themselves
immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated
into a practice without accepting the authority of the best stan
dards realized so far. If, on starting to listen to music, I do not
accept my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to
hear, let alone to appreciate, Bartok’s last quartets. If, on start
ing to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than
I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to
appreciate good pitching let alone to pitch.94

If practices, however, are to provide the common standards and au
thority needed within Illich’s learning webs, there are at least two
prerequisites. First, and most obviously, learners must be free to
enter into any practice they desire, though their success within that
practice is not guaranteed. Second, experienced master practition
ers must embody the standards and authority of practices and not
simply record them in institutional documents as rules and regula
tions. This second prerequisite is vital, not only for the obvious rea
son that living traditions are the only sort that carry any authority,
but also because the standards of any practice are generated and
extended through the pursuit of goods internal to that practice,
which can only be pursued by individuals, not institutions. This is
even the case when institutions exist primarily for the purpose of
supporting and promoting a particular practice. As MacIntyre
points out, institutions and the practices they support are, by na
ture, always already in a precarious relationship:
Practices must not be confused with institutions. Chess, physics
and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities
and hospitals are institutions. Institutions are characteristically
and necessarily concerned with what I have called external
94.

MACINTYRE, supra note 82, at 190.
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goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material
goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they
distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they
do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also
the practices of which they are the bearers. For no practices can
survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed
so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions—and
consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the
practices in question—that institutions and practices characteris
tically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the crea
tivity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness
of the institution. . . .95

The ramifications of this precarious relationship are not difficult to
discern, but let us briefly consider them, as they take us right back
to Illich.
The relationship between internal and external goods is such
that the pursuit of internal goods at times happily coincides with the
achievement of external goods (money, power, prestige). In such
cases, a practice’s standards carry real weight and are easily ex
tended by practitioners and the institution that supports them. At
other times, the pursuit of some internal goods may actually work
against the realization of external goods, in which case there are at
least two possible outcomes. First, if the supply of external goods is
sufficient, a practice’s practitioners and supporting institutions will
generally be in alignment, though each side will harbor some de
gree of ambivalence about the other. Second, if the supply of exter
nal goods is low enough to threaten the viability of an institution,
the standards of the practice that institution supports effectively
cease to matter—an institution will inevitably sacrifice them for the
sake of its own continued viability. As MacIntyre illustrates in his
chess-playing child example, once external goods become the pri
mary motivator for participation in a practice, there is no reason
not to cheat,96 or, in Illich’s terminology, “manipulate[ ].”97 This
institutional cheating/manipulation comes in various forms, but it
always has the effect of undermining the standards and authority of
the practice represented by the institution.98 Because such under
95. Id. at 194.
96. Id. at 188.
97. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 53-54.
98. Id. Illich, for example, refers to a “boomerang effect in war,” such that “a
higher . . . body count” means “more enemies,” and so a country “must spend to create
. . . manipulative institution[s] . . . in a futile effort to absorb the side effects of war.”
Id. at 54. In the same way, he asserts “that jail increases both the quality and quantity
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mining of standards and authority can in turn lead to a reduction of
an institution’s power and prestige, that institution must ironically
engage in further manipulation—at the very least engaging in what
we commonly call “spin”—in an attempt to cover up or distract
from its hypocrisy.99
Looking again at Illich’s proposed learning webs, this time
through the lens of MacIntyre’s conception of a practice, we might
see his desire to redistribute property from private hands to the
public’s as an attempt to limit the circumstances under which insti
tutions become manipulative. Property (wealth and the power and
prestige that come with it) is an external good, so Illich’s move to
increase the public’s ownership of and access to educational prop
erty is meant to help prevent his proposed learning webs—which
are of course institutions—from facing circumstances likely to re
sult in their having to manipulate to survive.
V. REDISCOVERING HOPE
There is an issue that remains, though. Illich’s learning webs
are meant to facilitate learning, not support chess players, cabinet
makers, historians, physicists, or other “masters of their art” en
gaged in other practices.100 If common standards and authority are
to be found in experienced master practitioners, where are we to
find such people, and what institutions will support them? Illich’s
proposed property rearrangement would seriously imperil the via
bility of those remaining institutions that at least ostensibly support
specific practices, which implies that he expects or hopes that those
practices will persist by other means. At the beginning of
Deschooling, after all, he notes,
of criminals, [and], in fact, it often creates them out of mere nonconformists.” Id. He
goes on to argue “that mental hospitals, nursing homes, and orphan asylums do much
the same thing . . . provid[ing] their clients with the destructive self-image of the
psychotic, the overaged, or the waif. . . .” Id.
99. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Wendell Berry Takes Back His Papers, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2010, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/wendell-berry-takes-back
his-papers/; Cheryl Truman, Wendell Berry Pulling His Personal Papers from UK, LEX
INGTON HERALD-LEADER (June 23, 2010), http://www.kentucky.com/2010/06/23/
1319383/wendell-berry-pulling-his-personal.html#ixzz0rgeddtAJ (discussing the contro
versy surrounding the University of Kentucky’s decision to name its new basketball
dorm the “Wildcat Coal Lodge” in exchange for a sizable donation from the Kentucky
coal industry, which led celebrated Kentucky author, and UK alumnus, Wendell Berry
to withdraw his papers from the university).
100. ILLICH, supra note 4, at 97.
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I have chosen the school as my paradigm, and I therefore deal
only indirectly with other bureaucratic agencies of the corporate
state: the consumer-family, the party, the army, the church, the
media. My analysis of the hidden curriculum of school should
make it evident that public education would profit from the
deschooling of society, just as family life, politics, security, faith,
and communication would profit from an analogous process.101

The deschooling process as framed by Illich is clearly meant, then,
to not be peculiar to education but to be representative of the sort
of change he sees as needed throughout our culture (hence
Deschooling Society, and not, Reforming Our Schools).
Once we recognize that Illich’s proposed learning webs suggest
not just a reformed education system but a wholly refigured culture,
the final chapter of Deschooling, whose inclusion may at first ap
pear a bit peculiar, takes on a new importance. This chapter, “The
Rebirth of Epimethean Man,” focuses on the difference between
hope and expectation, which is exemplified for Illich in the story of
Prometheus, Epimetheus, and Pandora:
The original Pandora . . . was an Earth goddess in prehistoric
matriarchal Greece. She let all ills escape from her amphora . . .
But she closed the lid before Hope could escape. The history of
modern man . . . is the history of the Promethean endeavor to
forge institutions in order to corral each of the rampant ills. It is
the history of fading hope and rising expectations.102

If our culture has embraced the Promethean ethos, it has, according
to Illich, completely forgotten Prometheus’s brother, Epimetheus.
He writes, “[t]he Greeks told the story of two brothers, Prometheus
and Epimetheus. The former warned the latter to leave Pandora
alone. Instead, he married her.”103 The brothers’ differing atti
tudes toward Pandora represent two responses to the idea of hope.
On the one hand, hope is forsaken in favor of expectation; on the
other hand, hope is embraced. Illich argues that we have forgotten
the distinction between hope and expectation, and it is a distinction
that must be rediscovered:
Hope, in its strong sense, means trusting faith in the goodness of
nature, while expectation, as I will use it here, means reliance on
results which are planned and controlled by man. Hope centers
desire on a person from whom we await a gift. Expectation looks
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
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forward to satisfaction from a predictable process which will pro
duce what we have the right to claim. The Promethean ethos has
now eclipsed hope. Survival of the human race depends on its
rediscovery as a social force.104

One way to read Illich here is to see him, in light of his emphasis on
hope, as wanting us to return to a more primitive world. He notes
that “[p]rimitive man lived in [a] world of hope. He relied on the
munificence of nature, on the handouts of gods, and on the instincts
of his tribe to enable him to subsist.”105 Illich, however, doesn’t
present such a world of hope as a lost ideal so much as he labors to
illuminate the ways in which a wholly planned world, a world built
around expectations, ironically traps us in our attempts to eliminate
life’s ills.106 He writes,
[m]an has developed the frustrating power to demand anything
because he cannot visualize anything which an institution cannot
do for him. Surrounded by all-powerful tools, man is reduced to
a tool of his tools. Each of the institutions meant to exorcise one
of the primeval evils has become a fail-safe, self-sealing coffin for
man. Man is trapped in the boxes he makes to contain the ills
Pandora allowed to escape . . . . Quite suddenly we find our
selves in the darkness of our own trap.107

Such an ironic fate is one born of hubris, Illich suggests, and indeed
another way to consider his hope-expectation dichotomy is as a
humility-hubris spectrum. Prometheus is, in fact, guilty of classic
hubris. As Illich notes, Prometheus “tricked the gods out of their
monopoly of fire, taught men to use it in the forging of iron, be
came the god of technologists, and wound up in iron chains.”108
And he makes a point of referencing two other mythical figures,
both guilty of hubris, and both of whom are punished through un
ceasingly frustrated expectations:
Sisyphus, who for a while had chained Thanatos (death), must
roll a heavy stone up the hill to the pinnacle of Hell, and the
stone always slips from his grip just when he is about to reach the
top. Tantalus, who was invited by the gods to share their meal,
and on that occasion stole their secret of how to prepare all-heal
ing ambrosia, which bestowed immortality, suffers eternal hunger
104.
105.
106.
earlier in
107.
108.

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
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Deschooling.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 115.
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and thirst standing in a river of receding waters, overshadowed
by fruit trees with receding branches.109

These figures should, Illich argues, serve to warn us of the paradox
of progress: “A world of ever-rising demands is not just evil—it can
be spoken of only as Hell.”110
CONCLUSION
We can see, then, that Illich addresses only partially and
vaguely the issues of common standards and authority in regard to
his learning webs, because, as I suspect he would point out, they are
just the sort of problems one would dwell on who knows only a
world of expectation. To design a learning system in which stan
dards and authority take precedence is, he would argue, to design
anew the sort of manipulative institution he wishes to eliminate—
questions of standards and authority are, after all, questions of con
trol. Institutions organized around expectations—manipulative in
stitutions—may seek to eliminate the disappointment, pain, and
unpredictability of life, but in the process they will always ironically
prevent us from being fully human. The structure of institutions
organized around hope is necessarily vague, on the other hand, be
cause such institutions treat humans as ends, seeking, despite inevi
table disappointments, to allow us to act freely and, from time to
time, perhaps realize our own transcendent potential. If such an
arrangement sounds overly hopeful to our modern ears, perhaps
that is Illich’s point.

109.
110.

Id. at 109.
Id.

